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Artificial Creativity: A Case Against Copyright for AI-Created Visual Artwork 
 
MEGAN SVEDMAN*  
 
ABSTRACT 
Artificial intelligence is becoming increasingly complex, and 
provides examples of compelling, human-like performances. One such 
artificial intelligence technology is known as Creative Adversarial 
Network (“CAN”) technology, which relies on inputs of preexisting pieces 
of art to create pieces of original art that pass as human-made. Whether 
the coders responsible for CAN-technology should be granted coverage 
for the resultant art remains an open question in United States 
jurisprudence. This paper seeks to explore why, given both software’s 
historical legacy in copyright law and bedrock copyright justifications, 
extending copyright coverage to the coders responsible for CAN 
technology would be a grave misstep in copyright policy.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
“Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases 
belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of 
the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined, 
and, sometimes, almost evanescent”.1 
 
 There is a phenomenon that occurs when artificial intelligence performs in a way that is so similar 
to humans, the humans witnessing the performance feel unsettled by it. The robot performs a human-like 
task, but there is generally something that remains off about the robot’s performance—a robotic tell—that 
reveals something not quite human. Imagine, for example, a human-like robot, controlled by artificial 
intelligence software, expressing sadness on its face with just a bit too much emptiness in its manufactured 
eyes. Creepy, no? The phenomenon, where a human loses interest in a piece of artificial intelligence is 
known as the uncanny valley, and it occurs when human interest dips to a low because of the unsettling 
nature of the technology’s performance.2  
 Historically, most forms of artificial intelligence fell into the uncanny valley. But now software 
developers are coding increasingly sophisticated iterations of artificial intelligence. People are starting to 
see technology that, for the first time, is passing as human. Artificial intelligence technology is exiting the 
uncanny valley and creating compelling, human performances. One such example is Creative Adversarial 
Network (“CAN”) technology, developed by art historians and computer scientists at Rutgers.3 CAN 
technology is designed to learn by analyzing input pieces of original art and creating novel pieces of visual 
art that are compellingly human.4 The creators responsible for the initial code are not involved with the 
“learning” process the machine goes through in creating more and more compelling pieces of visual art.5 
As such, the final piece is arguably created by the machine, but to the human eye, you would never be able 
to guess as much.  
 This new breed of creative artificial intelligence is introducing questions as yet unexplored in the 
field of copyright law. While software has long been considered copyrightable under the Copyright Act,6 
one might wonder whether the learned creativity of the machine that allows for the new piece of art really 
falls under the umbrella of software coverage, thus extending copyright ownership over the new piece of 
art to the original coders behind the AI. Should the coders behind CAN-technology (and other, similarly 
designed creative artificial intelligence) be extended copyright coverage for the resultant works the 
technology produces? The human-like quality of the work adds a layer of intrigue to the inquiry, prompting 
 
*Megan Svedman graduated from Northwestern Pritzker School of Law in 2019 and is currently working as an Associate at Sidley 
Austin LLP in Chicago. The views expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those 
of Sidley Austin LLP and its partners. This article has been prepared for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal 
advice. This information is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, a lawyer-client relationship. Readers should 
not act upon this without seeking advice from professional advisers 
1 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
2 Jeremy Hsu, Why “Uncanny Valley” Human Look-Alikes Put Us on Edge, SCI. AM. (Apr. 3, 2012), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-uncanny-valley-human-look-alikes-put-us-on-edge/ [https://perma.cc/BVL5-
XN6C].  
3 Ahmed Elgammal, Bingchen Liu, Mohamed Elhogeiny & Marian Mazzone, CAN: Creative Adversarial Networks Generating 
“Art” by Learning About Styles and Deviating from Style Norms 3 (Jun. 23, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.07068.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6NXS-EN9V]. 
4 Id. 
5Abigail Swarth, Creative Adversarial Networks (CAN), MEDIUM (Mar. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/@abbymilla/creative-
adversarial-networks-can-b4ae419772a2 [https://perma.cc/8SX5-M9PC]. 
6 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2012) (Software is considered a literary work under §102. Literary works are defined in § 101 as “works, 
other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature 
of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, films, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are 
embodied.”).  
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a more thorough examination of why copyright law exists, and what original pieces of authored work 
actually need to look like to receive coverage. Ultimately, to extend coverage to the coders behind the CAN 
artificial intelligence would be a load too great for copyright doctrine to bear, as many bedrock justifications 
for copyright coverage run counter to extending coverage to AI-created works. 
 In the subsequent sections, I seek to examine why extending copyright ownership of the artwork to 
the original coders responsible for the AI is unsatisfactory, and why the novel art created by the CAN 
technology should not receive any copyright protection. In Part II, I examine how CAN technology 
specifically works, and try to illustrate how and why figuring out copyright ownership with CAN-created 
artwork might have lasting impacts in the field of copyright and AI. Part III explores a straightforward, 
formalistic approach to assigning copyright ownership to AI-created pieces of original work, and why 
recognizing the latent theory of causation underlying copyright doctrine recommends against copyright 
protection for instances of AI-created pieces of visual art. Part III also argues that the history of software 
coverage under copyright law further attenuates the relationship between the coders responsible for CAN 
AI and the resultant artwork it creates. Part IV applies several paradigmatic justifications of copyright 
doctrine to illustrate how extending coverage to novel pieces of visual art created through AI CAN 
technology would fundamentally compromise copyright doctrine in an untenable manner. Part V concludes 
by reasserting that the coders responsible for CAN-AI should not be granted copyright ownership for AI-
created pieces of visual art. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
a. What is CAN technology and how does it work? 
 
 CAN technology was created by computer scientists and art historians at Rutgers University with 
an eye toward generating artwork using artificial intelligence that could pass as human created. Before 
outlining the mechanics of the technology, the philosophy behind the creative paradigm at work is valuable 
to explore a bit. The developers relied on philosopher D. E. Berlyne’s aesthetic theory, which suggests that 
humans respond affirmatively to artwork they find arousing in some capacity.7 Essentially, as an artist 
creates new artwork, she needs to infuse into her new work enough novelty8 to arouse additional responses 
from her intended audience.9  
Relying on Berlyne’s theory of arousal, they created a two-sided technology. On the one side, the 
technology receives inputs of original pieces of art, which it codes into its memory and updates with each 
additional exposure.10 The input side breaks down stylistic components of different categories of art, 
attempting to code a “language” for understanding the different creative elements of each input piece.11 On 
the other side, a generative component exists, wherein the technology tries to generate and discriminate 
between novel pieces of art.12 There are training sets of art, which the generative side knows to be the points 
of comparison for both human-created and machine-created art. The software then compares the novel, 
generated pieces to the training set to see if the system can detect whether the software itself or a human 
generated the work.13 In creating new pieces of work on the generative side, “[t]he agent’s goal is to 
generate art with increased levels of arousal potential in a constrained way without activating the aversion 
system and falling into the negative hedonic range. In other words, the agent tries to generate art that is 
novel, but not too novel.”14 
 
7 Elgammal et al., supra note 3, at 3.  
8 For purposes of Berlyne’s theory, “novelty” is not to be understood as a term of art according to intellectual property or patent 
law. Instead, it is understood as a subjective, viewer centered concept that denotes a sense of unfamiliarity or unusualness. Id. at 4. 
9 Id. at 4.  
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 5.  
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 4.  
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Put succinctly: there are cordoned-off sub-networks within the CAN technology designed to 
strengthen the generative component. The stronger that component gets, the less able the system—and 
humans—are at determining when the work was computer, and not human, generated. Ultimately, the 
Rutgers developers have created a complex technology that creates original pieces of art. The artificial 
intelligence behind the CAN technology is essentially “trained in a manner similar to the way artists grow 
and master their craft; they need to both utilize their prior experience and have regular exposure to art.”15 
In this way, the creative process is, in some ways, distinct from the initial programming that took place by 
the creators. As the machine “learns” how to be more creative, it does so in a space independent from the 
starting point of the code—it builds its own base of knowledge up, creating new data unimaginable by the 
initial coders.16 Given the disconnect from the initial code and the final product, one might wonder who 
owns the copyright for the resultant work. Is it the coders? The coders and the art historians? Could it be 
the machine itself?17 As the final product seeking copyright protection moves further and further away from 
the initial creator, questions abound as to who owns the copyright and why it matters. 
 
III. STARTING POINTS—FORMALISM, CAUSATION, AND A HISTORY OF SOFTWARE 
COVERAGE 
 
 In deciding whether AI-generated works should be extended copyright coverage and how, there is 
a relatively straightforward approach available: the author responsible for the software behind the artificial 
intelligence would also be considered the author of resultant pieces of art created by the AI that otherwise 
satisfy copyright’s originality and fixation standards.18 However, when examining copyright theory more 
closely, a latent theory of causation emerges which is a necessary part of the justification for granting 
copyright ownership to human authors. Relying on that latent theory of causation, I suggest that AI-created 
pieces of art lack the requisite causal connection to the upstream coders to justify a granting of copyright. I 
also explore how and why the fraught history of software coverage under copyright law further illustrates 
why such an attenuated relationship between original coders and AI-created pieces of art weighs against a 
position that the coders should be granted copyright ownership.  
 
a. A Straightforward Approach: Formalism and Causation in Designating Copyright 
Ownership 
 
Countries like the U.K. and prominent copyright scholars have suggested that working backwards 
from an AI-generated piece of art to the nearest human in the causal chain of events leading to the work’s 
production is the most straightforward and coherent approach to managing emerging AI-technologies and 
the accompanying output. The end result of that approach would be to grant copyright ownership to the 
upstream authors of the computer code responsible for the artificial intelligence. However, this formalistic 
approach fails to adequately recognize all of the ways in which copyright justifications are absent from AI-
created works—particularly our usual and implicit notions of causation. 
 
 
15 Swarth, supra note 5.  
16 Elgammal et al., supra note 3, at 21.  
17 No, certainly not, though as artificial intelligence becomes more and more sophisticated, one can imagine a scenario where 
anthropomorphizing might lead to such an assertion. Consider, for example, Naruto v. Slater, where the court held that a monkey 
who took some of the actions necessary to snap a selfie was not entitled to the copyright for the resultant photograph, as “[t]he  
argument that animals have statutory standing to maintain a Copyright Act claim—or any property right claims—is an easy 
question. Under the holding in Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004), the Copyright Act, and basic property 
law, animals have no such rights.” (888 F.3d 418, 428 (9th Cir. 2018)). Here, artificial intelligence has no embodied being to even 
consider extending coverage to.  
18 In moving forward, I will use “original” as a way to describe the works produced by artificial intelligence as a shorthand to 
describe them. While originality within the context of copyright law has attached to it a set of particular standards outlined in both 
statutory language and case law, I am instead using it more generally. An original work created by artificial intelligence, for 
purposes of this paper, means a work not before in fixed existence.  
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i. Formalist Approach to Copyright Ownership Through a Latent Theory of Causation 
 
 The United Kingdom recently passed a law amending their copyright code to get ahead of the issue 
explored in this paper. Under its Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, “[i]n the case of a literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom 
the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”19 Essentially, the coders 
responsible for the software behind the artificial intelligence’s learning heuristic are extended ownership 
over any resultant work that comes from the artificial intelligence.20 If CAN technology was created in the 
U.K., the question examined herein would have a positive answer—the coders behind CAN would own the 
copyright to the new pieces of visual art it creates.  
 Recent U.S. scholarship supports the notion that a U.K.-type statute be adopted in the United States. 
Such a formalist approach to copyright ownership relies on the causal chain of creation to justify coverage 
being extended to upstream authors. By extending copyright protection to the initial coders, this theory 
relies in part on the functionalist principle that copyright protection encourages creativity among authors, 
that it is a “system designed to advance the public goal of expanding knowledge, by means of stimulating 
the efforts and imaginations of private creative actors.”21 However, in the case of CAN software, the 
creativity of the initial coders is entirely obscured by the increasingly complex learning heuristics the 
artificial intelligence subsequently engages in. And so the creativity justification must pivot to rely much 
more heavily on a causation model. Because authorship is a requirement for copyright coverage,22 there of 
course must exist an author in instances of AI-created pieces of work that would otherwise meet copyright’s 
traditional standard for originality, particularly because of the underlying human act of creativity that 
prompts the artificial intelligence to create in the first place.23 The initial coder is arguably responsible for 
creating the possibility of the novel piece of art, and so even though the learning that the AI engages in to 
create the art is beyond the coder’s conceptualization, it was her code that ultimately caused the learning 
and resultant creation. In other words, “[a]ny apparent ‘creativity’ in a machine’s output is directly 
attributable either to the code written by the programmers who designed and trained the machine, or to the 
instructions provided by the users who operate the machine.”24  
 The suggestion that, “as long as [the coders], by designing the tool’s algorithm, or training a 
‘learning’ generative model to produce outputs, control the inner workings of the system, they have also 
executed the resulting works”25 arguably confuses control with causation. CAN, and equivalently complex 
artificial intelligence software, is as impressive as it is because the initial coders design a learning model 
which, after the coders initiate it, develops in a black box. In other words, while the designers can go in and 
rewrite the starting code relied upon for the AI to do its learning, the coders fundamentally do not know 
how the system learns. They do not control the instrumentality by which the final product is made. They 
instead cause the production by writing the starting code. While the formalists are right in suggesting that 
a causation theory underlies attachment of proper copyright protection to rightful owners, they are wrong 
in suggesting that artificial intelligence-created pieces—and specifically CAN-created pieces of visual art—






19 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3) (UK). 
20 Id.  
21 Jane Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1068 (2003).  
22 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
23 Jane Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, Authors and Machines 7 (Columbia Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 14-597, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3233885##. 
24 Id. at 58. 
25 Id. at 72.  
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ii. Proximate Cause in Copyright Ownership Analysis and Underlying Policy Justifications 
 
 The tenuousness of the proximate cause assertion formalists make with respect to creative artificial 
intelligence’s works and the initial software designers is deeply problematic. While copyright doctrine has 
not traditionally and explicitly relied on causation as a point of analysis, instead using an originality 
paradigm to question authorship or lack thereof, it embodies a latent theory of causation, recognizing the 
importance of an author’s intent and control26 with her right to assert ownership over a finished work.27 
Formalists concede that there is a latent theory of causation in copyright.28 But they argue that despite the 
necessity of a causal analysis in copyright ownership for AI designers, there is no problem because “the 
designer’s creative contribution is both the ‘cause-in-fact’ and the proximate cause of the resulting work.”29 
The designers are still entitled to ownership of any final creative work because their causal relationship is 
direct enough.  
Basic syllogisms may be enough to illustrate why the formalists’ presumptive attitudes about 
causation—specifically but-for cause—are potentially problematic. Under the formalist model, the exact 
antecedent code created by the designers is the sufficient condition for the intelligence to learn creative 
mechanisms and create a particular final piece of original art/set of art.30 In other words, if the designers 
code the particular artificial intelligence software, then an original piece of art will result. I instead would 
suggest that an adequately complex learning heuristic code—one that may or may not be identical to the 
one CAN creators designed—is a necessary condition for a particular piece of art to result. In other words, 
if a particular original piece of art created by AI exists, then so, too, does an adequately complex software 
code. Whereas the formalists suggest that by virtue of the code’s fixation, a piece of art results, I would 
instead suggest that by virtue of a piece of AI-created art existing, we know some sort of software preceded 
it. In the case of CAN technology, the AI learns from receiving and “understanding” outside pieces of art. 
The CAN intelligence learns from the art it receives, and so the software code as determined by the creators 
is sufficient but not necessary to produce any one piece of particular art.  
This is not to suggest that the inability to predict the outcome of a series of volitional acts on the 
part of the author immediately erases the requisite causal connective tissue to warrant a granting of 
copyright. Indeed, an historically significant case on the originality threshold recognizes the arbitrariness 
by which one can achieve the requisite level of originality, noting that “[a] copyist's bad eyesight or 
defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable 
variations,” to justify granting copyright to the author.31 The principle is still acknowledged today, as many 
recognize that “Jackson Pollack’s understanding of the forces of gravity and inertia are irrelevant to his 
ability to claim authorship over his drip paintings. The photographer need not understand how her digital 
camera transforms photons into digital image files to ‘control’ the camera and thus maintain an authorial 
claim to her photographs.”32 An author need not be in total control of the instrumentality by which an 
original piece of fixed work is created, nor does she need to understand all of the elements that contributed 
to the creation of a work. In the same vein, a tortfeasor may be the proximate cause of an injury even where 
circumstances beyond her control also played a part in her attached liability. That is why the causal 
 
26 See infra Section III(A)(i). 
27 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017).  
28 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 23, at 72 n.265. 
29 Id. 
30 “But the use of more sophisticated ‘learning’ models which we may not precisely understand or supervise—as opposed to more 
heavily programmed and interpretable ‘expert system’—does not change our initial conclusion that machines are not ‘creative.’ 
The only difference between a ‘learning’ machine and a programmed machine is that the ‘learning’ machine is partially self-
tuning—it can develop and improve its own internal processes and thus develop procedures which elude our understanding. But 
the machine still proceeds through a process fundamentally controlled by its programmers—the programmers determine what the 
machine should do (‘problem definition’), what to include in the model’s ‘training set’ (data collection and cleaning), what the 
model should look for in its training set (its ‘input parameters’ and its ‘outcome variables’), how the machine should seek to 
optimize itself (its ‘loss functions’), and when the machine should spring into action.” Id. at 63–64. 
31 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951).  
32 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 23, at 63. 
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relationship inquiry is so critical. The formalists view the human act of creating code sufficient to cause a 
resultant piece of art created by AI, thus justifying the granting of copyright over the art to them. In this 
way, the formalists are recognizing the importance of the human act involved, which is also relevant to a 
tort analysis of causation.33  
What the formalists fail to sufficiently examine, though, are the sorts of conditions that determine 
whether both but-for cause and proximate cause are present, and that each category often has attached to it 
an epistemic and evaluative component.34 Even if the but-for cause analysis weighs in the formalists’ favor, 
the proximate cause analysis illustrates the thin causal connection between the coders and the resultant 
artwork CAN-AI creates. In relying on both an epistemic and evaluative lens to determine where the line 
between cause-in-fact and proximate cause fall, these inquiries often involve highly policy-driven 
considerations; as Professor Wex Malone articulated, “[i]t is through the process of selecting what is to be 
regarded as a cause for the purpose of resolving a legal dispute that considerations of policy exert their 
influence in deciding an issue of cause-in-fact [and proximate cause].”35  
The formalist argument is one that recognizes the human requirement of copyright—a human must 
act such that they cause an original work to be fixed in a tangible medium, even if she is not in direct control 
of the instrumentality responsible for expressive fixation.36 But in relying so markedly on the human 
requirement, they fail to consider all of the ways in which copyright doctrine does not support the 
assignment of copyright ownership to the coders responsible for CAN technology and similarly created 
artificial intelligence. Copyright doctrine is upheld by a network of overlapping but often independent 
justifications. Each plays a role in exploring whether or not a particular piece of authored work should be 
granted copyright coverage. Using a causal nexus to better understand the bundle of justifications and 
philosophies copyright doctrine relies on, I argue that assuming a proximate causal relationship between 
the creators of the code and the resultant artwork in CAN technology is erroneous, and that doing so will 
fatally erode an already tenuous balance of such justifications and policies.  
 
b. Software as Copyrightable Material 
 
 While the formalists’ approach to understanding the assignment of copyright of AI-created pieces 
of work is unsatisfying when considered against the latent theory of causation embedded in copyright 
doctrine, it also fails to reflect on the nature of copyright in the initial software the initial software 
responsible for the artificial intelligence. The question of whether or not artificial intelligence technology 
should be covered by copyright—particularly in the case where AI creates a novel piece of writing—
inevitably carries with it the fraught legacy of software’s path to copyrightability. At its introduction, 
software as a piece of intellectual property was not automatically assigned copyright protection. In 1974, 
Congress created the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(“CONTU”) to discuss whether or not books in machine-readable form should be considered copies under 
the Copyright Act.37 CONTU eventually also considered whether or not the Copyright Act of 1976 should 
be amended to include a new category of written work to cover software under copyright law.38 It ultimately 
recommended that copyright law be rewritten to cover software, and so in 1980, four years after the last 
major revision of the Copyright Act, Congress adopted CONTU’s recommendations.39 Interestingly, 
despite Congress’ primary concerns about digitized versions of authored works that might be more easily 
 
33 Balganesh, supra note 20, at 50 (“It is indeed the centrality of this connection that forces the courts to look for, and classify, a 
human act as the cause of relevance from a host of background conditions.”). 
34 Id. at 52.  
35 Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 64 (1956). Note that at the time of his writing, tort law 
nomenclature was just delineating between cause-in-fact and proximate case. 
36 See Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 23, at 64.  
37 Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable 
Form, 4 DUKE L.J. 663, 696 (1984). 
38 Gerardo Con Diaz, The Text in the Machine: American Copyright Law and the Many Natures of Software, 1974–1978, 57 TECH. 
& CULTURE 753, 754 (2016).  
39 See Samuelson, supra note 37, at 694. 
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pirated wholesale, much of the convolution that currently exists in copyright jurisprudence is anchored to 
issues of derivative works and substantial similarity, where one piece of software copies expressive portions 
of another.40 CONTU’s failure to consider adequately address several elements of copyright doctrine with 
respect to the reality of software resulted in a piecemeal set of laws that reflect the imperfect fit between 
copyright and software . 
 In extending copyright coverage to software code, the CONTU report failed to adequately address 
a bedrock principle justifying copyright: disclosure.41 Generally, when an author publishes a work, the work 
itself is what the public consumes, and so the work is adequately disclosed such that the public knows what 
was authored. The public can view a painting, can buy and read a book, can download and stream a song. 
While the 1976 Copyright Act got rid of the publication requirement in order to receive copyright coverage, 
there was little need to articulate such a requirement prior to software’s introduction—commercially 
successful pieces that were published were commercially successful by virtue of the public’s access to the 
work.42 Rewarding an author for her work is certainly a cornerstone justification behind copyright, but 
copyright protection does not exist purely to reward the creative labors of the author.43 Instead, there is a 
reciprocal nature embedded in copyright law, which “imagines that we are ethical beings, capable of being 
creative and of being touched by the creativity of others, include to be sociable and to return good for 
good.”44 Authors publish their works for public consumption, and audiences pay for access to those works. 
The creativity of the original author contributes to aggregate body of authorship, which ultimately benefits 
the public. Thus the need for disclosure.  
 With software code, though, the automatic disclosure and exchange that generally happen through 
copyright registration is missing.45 Part of the issue arose from CONTU’s fundamental misunderstanding 
of copyright code; CONTU assumed that software code could be printed in a human-readable form and so 
in that way was a written work like any other copyrightable work.46 Not only are most humans unable to 
discern any expressive meaning from written code on its own,47 but the entirety of a software’s code does 
not even need to be filed with the Copyright Office for a valid registration to be on file.48 Instead, the 
original coders can keep secret the precise authored work that leads to the limited computer-based interface 
consumers get to experience. Ultimately, consumers experience a limited set of interactive processes that 
software “performs” or “creates” on a computer, but the consumer is left with no sense of what the authors 
have literally written.  
 Beyond failing to adequately examine issues surrounding disclosure, the CONTU report also 
problematically concluded that “all programs produced display of words, pictures, or sounds and that the 
displays were the object of copyright protection.”49 CONTU assumed that all programs had pictures, words, 
or music that an end user would be able to experience50 when, in fact, only a small fraction of programs 
produced any meaningful display.51 CONTU also failed to explore the literal mechanics of software, and 
inconsistently addressed the differences between source and machine code.52 What resulted was a muddled 
sense of what copyright law actually covered when it came to software, and so courts have been left to try 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 710. 
42 Id. at 711. 
43 Id. at 712. 
44 James Grimmelmann, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2006 (2009) (“Or, more succinctly, 
authors and audiences ought to respect each other.”).  
45 See Samuelson, supra note 37, at 712. 
46 Id. at 724.  
47 Some may take umbrage with this suggestion, asserting that any expressive meaning embedded in a particular code by its author 
might actually communicate a unique expression of an idea to someone who is able to read code. However, the fact that the entirety 
of a code’s structure need not be disclosed still creates problems within the public disclosure paradigm in copyright law. 
48 See Samuelson, supra note 37, at 716.  
49 Id. at 723–34. 
50 Final Report on the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 53 (1979). 
51 Samuelson, supra note 37, at 704. 
52 Id. None of this is hugely surprising, given that none of the CONTU commissioners tasked with exploring whether or not software 
should be covered under copyright had experience in software. See Con Diaz, supra note 38, at 759. 
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and parse out a meaningful body of jurisprudence to determine the extent of copyright coverage for 
software.53  
 Perhaps the most complicated area of software-copyright jurisprudence has been in determining 
where functionality ends and creativity begins. Copyright law has long recognized the existence of a 
division between the creative expression of a work and any function or functionality expressed therein.54 
Courts have extended that logic to software, recognizing through Myriad cases that a software’s program 
functionality is distinct from the original expression contained therein and should not receive coverage.55 
But because the line between expression and functionality in software is so blurry—particularly because 
copyright coverage extends to the code itself, and not just to the accompanying images, readable text, or 
sounds associated with an individual program—creating an easily applied test for determining where the 
line should fall has largely been a fool’s errand for the courts. As it stands now, while there is not technically 
a specific ruling that requires exact copying before infringement is found, the thin gloss of coverage that 
software receives in the wake of a series of landmark cases essentially amounts to as much.56 
 The problems attached to software copyright jurisprudence are manifold, and plenty of scholars 
have explored whether CONTU’s initial recommendations should have been adopted, or if a different area 
of the law—such as patent or trade secret—would have been a more appropriate avenue to protect the 
property interests of software creators.57 Ultimately, software is covered, and there are arguably points of 
discernible creative decision making in any source code that entitles a coder to copyright protection.  
 Putting aside questions of whether software alone should not receive copyright coverage, pieces of 
art resulting from the source code responsible for CAN technology are illustrative of how software coverage 
created a confusing opening in copyright law, one which is now reaching untenable uncertainty. In CAN 
intelligence, the coders depend on their individual creative expressions to create an algorithm that is, 
essentially, designed to create a learning ability.58 Whatever unique expression the coders are arguably 
bringing to their work is embedded entirely in the initial code. Beyond the code, the learning algorithm 
develops and strengthens specifically through receiving inputs of other, already-authored pieces of visual 
art.59 In a traditional software program—for example, one where the end user is able to depend on 
individually designed icons to perform a series of functions—the end piece is discernable at some point in 
the source code. The experience of the software cannot extend beyond the parameters of the underlying 
source code. With CAN technology, though, the coders have created an algorithm that is specifically 
designed to expand beyond whatever they could have envisioned in their initial coding.60 The algorithm 
prompts the adversarial networks to break down input pieces of art and create new, original pieces.61 The 
 
53 Samuelson, supra note 37, at 728.  
54 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (holding that a system for accounting could not wholesale be covered under 
copyright, and instead only extending coverage to the unique and expressive elements in a book explaining the accounting system). 
55 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that printer-cartridge specific 
components of the software merged the idea with expression and thus was not coverable by copyright); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland 
Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814–15 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (holding that command 
hierarchy on a spreadsheet program was an integral part of a method of operation and thus excluded from receiving copyright 
coverage per 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that courts should 
filter out unprotectable “functional” elements of a program through an “abstraction-filtration-comparison” framework before 
assessing infringement claims); Whelan Assocs v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (holding that “structure, sequence, and organization” of a program was protectable expression unless there 
was only one way to sufficiently express a function). 
56 See supra note 55. 
57 See generally Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is 
Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV 977 (1993); Samuelson, supra note 37.  
58 Elgammal et al., supra note 3, at 4.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 5.  
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new pieces that result are in no way connected to the underlying code. Instead, they are aggregates of visual 
tropes taken from whatever input pieces the machine used to learn from.62  
 In some ways, the publicly consumable piece that results from CAN intelligence supports an 
argument that the upstream coders should be extended coverage if we are to take the criticism of CONTU’s 
reasoning seriously—in this case, we have public disclosure of a purely creative piece, and so unlike 
software, a piece of art is easily viewed and understood by the public. However, the piece of art is created 
in a space entirely beyond the comprehension of the upstream coders, in a black box “learning” space that 
builds its knowledge through reliance on a body of outside pieces of art.63 The expressive nature of code, 
expression that is dependent upon the coders’ own thoughts, ideas, and decision, is entirely lacking in any 
resulting piece of art. The justifications relied upon by those who support maintaining software’s protection 
under copyright are entirely absent from the suggestion that CAN technology art work should be granted 
copyright coverage, and that the owners of the copyright should be the coders. The coders, in some sense, 
have exclusively created a functional device that learns how to create independently from them. 64 Unlike 
a case where a photographer might set up a camera and have it take shots at random, here, the link between 
the original source code and the AI-generated piece of art is almost undiscernible.  
 CAN technology illustrates how software does not fit neatly into the copyright coverage 
framework. Given how far beyond the parameters of the source code the resultant piece of original art is, 
extending coverage of the piece to the coders has no discernible benefit beyond ensuring a clean line of 
ownership over the piece. While one might claim that the individual moments of creative decision-
making a coder engages in when developing a new software entitles her to coverage, CAN technology 
creates such a darkened path between the original source coders’ decisions and whatever piece results that 
extending copyright coverage for CAN-generated artwork would leave software copyright doctrine 
vulnerable to potentially fatal attacks, ones that resurface the original criticisms lobbied against software 
coverage without the shield of discernible creative expression on the part of the coders.  
 
IV. PARADIGMATIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT 
 
 Copyright jurisprudence is built upon a network of separate, overlapping, and sometimes 
countervailing and conflicting justifications. There are the more traditional justifications, which often rest 
on platforms of rights- or economics-based justifications. A rights-based doctrine most often relies on the 
personality theory, which posits that a truly original piece of authorship should have infused into it a sense 
of the author herself.65 Economic justifications for copyright coverage run the gamut of positions, but one 
of the most long-lasting theories is the incentive-access paradigm, which demands that an author be granted 
monopolistic control over her work in order to cover the costs of expression and production.66 Finally, there 
are post-modern theories for understanding creativity, which recognize the cultural commons that human 
authors must interact with in order to create a digestible piece of creative authorship for the public.67 In 
examining all of these justifications for copyright, none support the extension of copyright coverage to the 
 
62 Id. While this paper does not seek to explore whether or not the new work created is a derivative work, given that the resultant 
pieces are entirely composed of creative schemes from other, likely separately covered work, one might ask whether or not the 
coders are committing infringement on all input pieces when generating “new” pieces through the machine. 
63 Id. at 8–9.  
64 Consider, too, that “[t]here is one very simple but important difference between a book which contains a set of instructions about 
how to do a particular task and a computer program in machine-readable form which contains a similar, if considerably more 
elaborate, set of instructions on the same subject: The former informs a human being about how the task might be done; the latter 
does the task.” Samuelson, supra note 37, at 727. In this instance, too, the software—even if printed in some readable, 
comprehensible form, would still do little to describe the creative process. Instead, it would only explain how to create an 
environment where a machine might learn how to be creative. 
65 GEORG WILHELM FREDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 68 (Allen W. Wood eds., H.B. Nisbet trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991). 
66 Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive–Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 1841 (2014). 
67 See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (Yale 
Univ. Press, 2012). 
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coders responsible for CAN-created pieces of art, and so even though the coders are the cause-in-fact for 
the artwork that results, the proximate cause analysis falls short. Because CAN-AI-created artwork cannot 
be justified by any of the following bedrock justifications for copyright coverage, it stands that the coders 
behind CAN-technology should not be granted coverage for the artwork that results from the AI’s learning.  
 
a. The Continuing Legacy of Personality Theory 
 
 Granting ownership over intellectual property by relying on the concept of “author” was not always 
as straightforward as it now seems. In fact, the theory of author as person responsible for the creation of a 
resultant work was only first philosophically introduced in the 18th century.68 Authorship as ownership was 
introduced with respect to publishers, who were considered not just the owners but also the authors of 
printed books they would then disseminate.69 An “author” as we would understand her today did not have 
any property rights.70 Writers were assumed to be taking realized truths and reducing them to writing; the 
ideas were all in the public domain, as the theory of individual creativity was only ever a result of divine 
intervention, of which no one could claim “ownership.”71 However, as modes of production expanded and 
individualism as a cultural milieu emerged, the tension between author and user increased, such that, “the 
‘authorship’ constrict accumulated force and circumstantiality, [and] the strategic manner in which the 
construct initially had been deployed was effaced.”72 People across Europe were more literate than ever, 
and reading for personal pleasure was increasing rapidly.73 The notion of writer as craftsman—an individual 
using a learnable skill to create a utilitarian product—no longer provided enough economic incentive for 
writers.74 In other words, authors began developing and honing a personal style to their writing; they no 
longer felt that they were just transcribing already-existent truths, and instead began to feel the pull to 
market their particular writings to a growing number of readers.75 
 Unsurprisingly, as associations between the individual creator of a work and the end user became 
more complex, ways of limiting the rights of each party at either end of the spectrum began to emerge as 
well. As a point of departure, it will be valuable to introduce the idea of legal subject. The tradition of the 
legal subject in the wake of Enlightenment rationalism rests on three key attributes:  
He is, first and foremost, a definitionally autonomous being possessed of abstract liberty 
rights that are presumed capable of exercise regardless of context. Second, the legal subject 
possessed at least the capacity for rational deliberation and this capacity too is detached 
from context . . . Finally, the selfhood that the legal subject possessed is transcendent and 
immaterial; it is distinct from the body in which the legal subject resides.76 
 
 Contextualized in this spirit, the emerging theory of author vis-à-vis legal subject prompted the 
exploration of the individual as his work, an exploration that has left its mark on contemporary thought. 
Intuitive today is the sense that an author, because her personality is in some way infused into the essence 
of her work, is entitled to the same sort of bundle of rights we associate with real property.77 Hegel’s 
personality theory nicely articulates some of the philosophical underpinnings responsible for our 
contemporary conception of author. In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel first asserts that 
 
68 Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,”1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 470 (1991). 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author', 17 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 434 n.19 (1984). 
72 See Jaszi, supra note 68, at 470 n.59. 
73 See Woodmansee, supra note 71, at 426. 
74 Id. at 427.  
75 Id. 
76 See COHEN supra note 67, at 16. 
77 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 281, 288 (1970). 
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personality embodies the subjective whole of the individual. 78 While the theory is dense, for the purposes 
of understanding legal rights over intellectual property, Hegel suggests that because articulations of the 
intellect into consumable property (i.e. a book, a treatise, a painting) are a result of the individual spirit’s 
capability of expressing and disposing of them, the connection that exists between the original thinker and 
the resultant work entitles the author to exercise rights of production and dissemination.79 In other words, 
the outward manifestation of the self-awareness that accompanies the personality is requisite in creating a 
piece of intellectual property. It is a quasi-personality, quasi-property. The elemental necessity that 
attributes of the free spirit be disposed of through fixed expression requires that a footprint of the author be 
recognizable in the work.  
Hegel’s theory of personality is one among many from the 19 th century that attached exclusive 
rights over a piece of intellectual property to the original author responsible, and justified doing so primarily 
through an understanding that a part of the self was infused into the authored work.80 The consequence of 
such a person-centered understanding of authorship and ownership was a set of seminal cases that rested 
squarely on an understanding that the uniqueness of an individual’s creative process—even where there 
was only minimal creativity—entitled the author to copyright protection.81 
Even as copyright doctrine has expanded and complicated, adding layers of doctrinal gloss and 
countervailing justifications, personality theory has remained firmly attached to its nucleus. Take, for 
example, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), which codified the right of a visual artist to 
avoid having her “honor or reputation” tarnished.82 Particularly relevant when considering CAN 
intelligence, VARA provides protection for authors of visual art, ensuring that even once they sell a painting 
to a user, that user is statutorily prevented from modifying the painting. The language of the statute 
straightforwardly relies on the notion that the author’s honor or reputation would de facto be tarnished if 
her work was modified after it left her possession. This goes beyond just the regular 17 U.S.C §106 
 
78 HEGEL, supra note 65, at 68 (“The highest achievement of a human being is to be a person; yet in spite of this, the simple 
abstraction ‘person’ has something contemptuous about it, even as an expression. The person is essentially different from the 
subject, for the subject is only the possibility of personality, since any living thing whatever is a subject. A person is therefore a 
subject which is aware of this subjectivity, for as a person, I am completely for myself: the person is the individuality of freedom 
in pure being-for-itself. As this person, I know myself as free in myself, and I can abstract from everything, since nothing confronts 
me but pure personality . . . . Personality is thus at the same time the sublime and the wholly ordinary; it contains this unity of the 
infinite and the utterly finite, of the determinate boundary and the completely unbounded.”). 
79 Id. at 74–75 (“It may be asked whether the artist, scholar, etc. is in legal possession of his art, science, ability to preach a sermon , 
hold a mass, etc.—that is, whether such objects are things. We hesitate to call such accomplishments, knowledge, abilities, etc. 
things; for on the one hand, such possessions are the object of commercial negotiations and agreements, yet on the other, they are 
of an inward and spiritual nature. Consequently, the understanding may find it difficult to define their legal status, for it thinks only 
in terms of the alternative that something is either a thing or not a thing . . . . Knowledge, sciences, talents, etc. are of course 
attributes of the free spirit, and are internal rather than external to it; but the spirit is equally capable, through expressing them, of 
giving them an external existence and disposing of them, so that they come under the definition of things . . . . Thus, intellectual 
accomplishments, sciences etc. are relevant here only in their character as legal possessions . . . .”). 
80 Consider, for example, Kant’s argument for protecting authored works: “Kant probably saw the author’s attempt to communicate 
with the public as an act of the author with which unauthorized copying could unjustifiably interfere; because such copying might 
thus unnecessarily inhibit the author’s liberty, he saw a ‘natural obligation’ not to ‘counterfeit’ books.” See supra Breyer, note 77, 
at 290.  
81 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“The copy is the personal reaction of an individual 
upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest 
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction 
in the words of the act.”); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54–55 (1884) (“[T]hat the same is a useful, new, 
harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that said plaintiff made . . . entirely from his own original mental conception, 
to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, 
and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing 
the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation , 
made entirely by the plaintiff . . . .”). 
82 17 U.S.C. §106A(a)(3)(A) (2012) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . .shall have the right to prevent any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any 
intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right.”). 
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exclusive rights that generally attach to authored works; it attaches authorial rights to the physical iteration 
of her creativity. The author’s personhood is recognized as embedded in the painting itself.  
There exists, of course, valid criticism of artist rights ideology, resulting primarily from a statutory 
expansion of copyright coverage, which has diluted personality theory’s force. Maps and atlases, for 
example, are afforded copyright coverage despite the fact that the author’s primary goal is generally to 
avoid infusing the objective representation with a sense of self.83 Indeed, as quickly as the personality theory 
justifying ownership rights in authors developed, so, too, did other justifications for granting property rights 
to authors.84 Nonetheless, the legacy of personality theory remains foundational to an understanding of 
copyright coverage, and is a critical doctrinal consideration when determining whether a new sort of work 
should be extended copyright coverage.  
Perhaps the most robust criticism against granting copyright coverage to CAN-created pieces of 
visual art is that the resulting pieces of art are entirely lacking a trace of the original coders’ expression. In 
developing a learning heuristic that breaks down already-existent pieces of visual art and distills the creative 
elements behind the pieces to learn, all of the “creativity” present in a new piece of art comes either from 
the additional “learning” the AI program has done or from elements of already-existent works. The original 
coders have hardly “caused” the new work to exist in the proximate-cause sense, despite their critical role 
in writing the initial code. Given the persistence of personality theory in copyright doctrine, CAN-created 
pieces of visual art are missing the vital trace of the coders’ personality to justify granting them copyrights.  
 
b. Economic (Un)Justifications for Copyright Coverage to CAN 
 
A cornerstone justification for extending copyright coverage to an author of an original work is to 
fairly compensate her for her labor. The incentive-access paradigm is one economic justification for 
copyright that offers a “solution to the public-policy problem generated by the fact that informational works 
are often costly to create but inexpensive to copy.” 85 In order for authors to be properly rewarded for their 
creative works, copyright provides them with a monopolistic-like power over the work; the author can 
exercise control over an alienable set of property rights such that she can receive just compensation for the 
work if and when it is disseminated and copied.86  
More specifically, the incentive theory of copyright protection “…trades off the costs of limiting 
access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place…. For 
copyright law to promote economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrine must, at least approximately, 
maximize the benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the 
costs of administering copyright protection.”87 The incentive theory examines two elements—the cost of 
expression and the cost of production—in justifying copyright coverage for a work.88 The cost of expression 
involves the creative costs associated with authoring an original piece of work, whereas production costs 
include the copying and disseminating of the original work.89 The incentive-access economic model for 
justifying copyright is not the only economic model scholars have applied. In fact, there are schools of 
 
83 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287, 341 (1988). 
84 “The gradual process of converting the abstract principle of authorial ownership of the product of the intellect into concrete 
doctrinal and institutional forms unfolded during the nineteenth century. It was by no means a process in which a predetermined 
logic of authorship embedded in copyright at the end of the eighteenth century gradually manifested itself. Rather, the abstract 
concepts of authorial ownership operated as a repository of intellectual resources drawn on in order to construct arguments and 
legal doctrines. This shaping and bending of concrete authorship-based arguments was done in service of a variety of interests and 
agendas, which were frequently in tension with each other.” OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1790–1909, at 63–64 (2016). 
85 Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive–Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 1841, 1843 (2014). 
86 Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, 
Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of Government-Run Reward Systems, 9 Fordham Intell.  Prop. Media & 
Ent. L.J. 301, 304 (1998).  
87 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).  
88 Id. at 330. 
89 Id. at 326–27, 330.  
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thought that suggest free access to creative works might actually increase sales,90 and there are plenty of 
theories that fall somewhere in between. Ultimately, potential economic justifications for copyright run the 
gamut, but a more conservative incentive-access paradigm—i.e., one where expressive and production costs 
are used as starting points to justify an alienable set of rights afforded to the author—has provided a bedrock 
for myriad common law and academic thought, and is often relied upon when discussing the need to provide 
copyright coverage.91  
The incentive-access model used to justify monopolistic control over a novel piece of authored 
work is not free from toothsome criticism, though, particularly when examining the breadth of monopolistic 
force that attaches to certain production entities now. When considering the resources that entities like 
music and movie studios have at their disposal, the extensive and long-living protections afforded whenever 
a new piece of media is created provide more protection than necessary to incentivize continued creativity.92 
Traditionally, the significant resources required to produce a huge movie and to ensure licensing protections 
are properly executed weighs in favor of extending robust copyright coverage. However, as movie and 
music studios have grown in scale and have significant market monopolies, query whether copyright is 
incentivizing others to create as well.93 With that in mind, increasing scrutiny has been directed at highly 
corporatized methods of producing creative works that then receive copyright coverage.94 While generally 
folks agree that protection of some sort should exist for the big movie studio, it might not be as deserving 
of monopolistic-like protection as the singular author toiling away at her desk writing the next Great 
American Novel.  
Questions of scale of production and commercial viability remain open with respect to CAN-
generated works of art. If similar AI technology is any indication, though, CAN will likely be used for 
development and production of commercial art, at least to an extent.95 While commercial intent is not in 
itself problematic—commercial motivation sits comfortably within the confines of the incentive 
paradigm—when considering scale and mode of production, positioning justification on covering costs 
starts to run thin. As CAN learns, it becomes better and better at creating new, compelling works of art. If 
it can create new work almost instantaneously, satisfying different end-users’ aesthetic desires, the initial 
coders would be entitled to an expansive set of copyrights over innumerable pieces of art. Again, typically, 
the incentive theory looks to the cost of expression and the cost of production in justifying copyright 
coverage for a work.96 With CAN-created pieces of art, the cost of production no doubt remains, but the 
initial cost of expression dramatically decreases once the AI begins to learn and develop new styles on its 
own. Given the significant set of rights attached to copyright,97 as well as the length of a copyright’s life,98 
granting such extensive coverage to the initial coders would go beyond covering expression and production 
costs. Much like the scrutiny that more radical copyright critics have directed at huge production studios 
for exercising such strong control over creative ventures,99 CAN coders could potentially be entitled to 
aggressive copyright protection for innumerable pieces of art.  
While the coders’ labor should rightly be rewarded, and the resultant art might be entitled to 
protection through some other intellectual property or trade secret law doctrine,100 extending copyright 
coverage in particular is needlessly vigorous. If a copyright doctrine seeks to encourage creativity and the 
 
90 See generally JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2008). 
91 Bracha & Syed, supra note 85, at 1844. 
92 MARTIN SKLADANY, BIG COPYRIGHT VERSUS THE PEOPLE 88 (2018). 
93 Id.  
94 Id. 
95Ian Bogost, The AI-Art Gold Rush is Here, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/ai-created-art-invades-chelsea-gallery-scene/584134/.  
96 Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 330. 
97 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) 
98 17 U.S.C. § 302. 
99 See SKLADANY supra note 92, at 88. 
100 Consider Pamela Samuelson’s exploration of the limitations of copyright law for software coverage, where she suggests that 
other areas of law might be able to effectively gap-fill in the absence of extending copyright coverage to software coders. 
Samuelson, supra note 37, at 759. 
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dissemination of ideas, and in doing so aims to provide economic incentives to authors, extending copyright 
protection to the coders responsible for the AI that can create paintings ad infinitum goes beyond that goal. 
Instead, it provides a fierce set of protections to individuals who have little control over the final piece of 
authored work that their name is attached to. In contrast to the underlying code—which can receive 
copyright coverage such that future coders might be incentivized to create, knowing that they will be able 
to reap the benefits of asserting ownership over the code—the AI-created artwork will not change in 
quantity or quality based on whether the coders receive coverage or not. Because financial incentives 
quickly become irrelevant to whether or not CAN will create new, interesting, or marketable pieces of art, 
it renders the incentive-access paradigm inapplicable. 
 
c. Creativity Beyond the Author: Culture as a Force Behind Creativity 
 
In opposition to the more traditional personality or incentive theories justifying copyright coverage, 
some scholars have suggested that individual creativity is the result of cultural inputs and heritage—a sort 
of collective set of individual and cultural building blocks that come together to create unique pieces of 
artistic expression.101 Contemporary social theory has pushed back against the position that copyright 
doctrine can and should be aesthetically value-neutral, one that many copyright theorists and judges have 
promulgated in the past, insisting instead that by recognizing the “creativity” of certain pieces and not in 
others, copyright jurisprudence is, in fact, making sets of value judgments.102 But reception of more post-
modern theories of copyright and knowledge production have been met with reductive misunderstanding, 
landing in a space that imagines copyright doctrine either must be merit-based or entirely relativistic if 
cultural contextualization comes into play.103  
Contemporary approaches to social and cultural theories that “emphasize the contingent, iterative, 
socially situated development of knowledge are rooted in philosophical traditions that liberalism has 
resisted,” and so it is unsurprising that such models have received lukewarm reception by more traditional 
thinkers.104 However, in recognizing the marked influence culture can have on an author, we can create a 
copyright scheme that balances freedom of artistic expression with the recognition that larger cultural 
institutions inevitably direct the landscape of possible creative expression. Such a position demands two 
fundamental modifications to an approach to copyright: 
First, [it] require[a] that progress be assigned a more open-ended interpretation. Stripped 
of its association with modernist teleologies, progress consists, simply, in that which causes 
knowledge systems to come under challenge and sometimes to shift. Second, and precisely 
because this understanding of progress abandons the comforting fiction of modernist 
teleologies, a postmodernist approach to knowledge demands careful attention to the ways 
that law and culture evaluate and awards (or penalize) artistic and intellectual production.105  
 
In other words, “[c]opyright’s system of incentives and rules is not, and could not, be neutral about 
the content of progress.”106 The law guides behavior, and so in addition to the cultural devices that shape 
an individual’s sense of creative expression, so, too, will copyright incentivize certain forms of creativity 
over others. Recognizing as much, a more post-modern approach to understanding creativity and cultural 
capital might better equip copyright scholars to create a more nuanced, delicate set of copyright laws.  
 
101 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1165, 1170 (2007) (“Together, 
[social and cultural theory] argue for an account of artistic and intellectual creativity that is decentered: that incorporates multiple 
contributing factors and makes none primary. This account should explore creativity as an emergent property of social and cultural 
systems, continually shaped by and shaping other social changes.”). 
102 See COHEN, supra note 67, at 71. 
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On a more granular level, post-modern theory can assist in shaping a more nuanced approach to 
copyright law by recognizing the inherently context-dependent nature of ideas. While copyright law does 
not protect ideas, only the expression of them, ideas are inevitably guided by the cultural landscape on 
which they are born. As culture shifts, and zeitgeist attitudes guide our understanding of certain forms of 
expressions of certain ideas, so, too, does the landscape of available creative expression. Consider 
Bourdieu’s theory of the field of cultural production, which essentially recognizes that within the space of 
a particular cultural moment, there are a number of possible forms of creative expression for a particular 
idea; as an artist takes a position, it may help to expand or contract a given cultural space for a given idea.107 
As a result, trying to re-contextualize the expression of an idea after its cultural moment has passed is nearly 
impossible.108  
Michel Foucault was one of the first thinkers to recognize the inherent power attached to certain 
ideas and expressions, recognizing that those in positions of power were better able to assert their versions 
of truth or expression over others.109 This Foucauldian tradition recognizes that “no cultural product exists 
by itself, i.e. outside the relations of interdependence which link it to other products,” giving it the name 
“‘field of strategic possibilities’ to the regulated system of differences and dispersions within which each 
individual work defined itself.”110 The intersection of power and recognizable forms of creativity can be 
most readily seen in the validating institutions (of which copyright jurisprudence is arguably a part) that 
recognize, laud, or reject certain forms of creative expression over others.111 Accepting cultural theorists’ 
position that texts reflect a context-specific meaning, the cultural-transmission function performed by artists 
is one of promulgating more ideas for public discourse. Limiting protection of the artist’s articulation of 
the idea only to its particular form of expression leads to an even thinner gloss of copyright coverage than 
what traditional theories have often supported.112 Even more traditional rights-and economics-based 
theorists recognize that expanded rights of copying are justified by support for an increased free-flow of 
ideas.113 If ideas are shaped by cultural narratives, and so acceptable, understandable creative material is 
arguably a collective good to which every potential artist might have some access, then copyright coverage, 
and any resultant disputes, will necessarily revolve around “identifying those expressions that  should be 
treated ‘like’ ideas.”114 Consider scenes à faire, substantial similarity tests, and the merger doctrine, all of 
which recognize that where the idea and expression are too closely related, that there is too much similarity 
 
107 PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION 30–31 (1993) (“The literary or artistic field is a field of forces, but it 
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their positions (i.e. their position-takings), strategies which depend for their force and form on the position each agent occupies in 
the power relations . . . . Every position-taking is defined in relation to the space of possibles which is objectively realized as a 
problematic in the form of the actual or potential position-takings corresponding to the different positions; and it receives its 
distinctive value from its negative relationship with the coexistent position-takings to which it is objectively related and which 
determine it by delimiting it. It follows from this, for example, that a position-taking changes, even when the position remains 
identical, whenever there is change in the universe of options that are simultaneously offered for producers and consumers to choose 
from. The meaning of a work changes automatically with each change in the field within which it is situated for the spectator or 
reader.”). 
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between the initial idea and the resultant expression, there should not exist copyright protection for the 
author of the work under consideration.115 These are all necessarily shaped by cultural recognition of certain 
forms of expression for certain ideas over others, and so must necessarily be grounded in some sort of 
recognition of a collective creative vocabulary. Bourdieu’s recognition that power and acceptable forms of 
expression confine the set of ideas accessible to any one artist emphasizes that novel expression of available 
ideas is more restricted than what personality theories or economic incentive theories might otherwise 
suggest.116 Instead, the post-modern recognition that there exists a cultural commons that dictates available 
forms of expression also comes with recognition of a communal ownership over certain forms of 
expression,117 which inevitably are shaped by the available cultural lexicon. 
Ideas that are embodied—or fixed in a tangible medium—in a form of palatable and original 
expression according to cultural expectations are then afforded copyright coverage. The sense of 
embodiedness for work is significant on two levels. The first is that consumers, influenced by creative 
pieces and therefore able to contribute their own new creative pieces, have disparate access to various 
works. Even though a work is properly fixed in a tangible medium such that it receives coverage, it may 
not circulate widely enough that most of the public will have access. In this way, recognizing the importance 
of embodiedness in copyright theory is quite literal—there are physical people taking up physical space 
interacting with physical pieces of creative expression.118 The other level is that ideas embodied in a form 
of expression have traditionally and necessarily been filtered through the human creator. Harkening back 
in some ways to the personality theory explored above, the human element of embodying a form of 
expression necessarily contributes to the cultural collective that allows for future acts of creativity.119 
Consider fan fiction as a consummate form of this sort of embodiedness. The characters and text fans rely 
upon is funneled through them, through their community, to create additional narratives in the lives of the 
characters. The human filtration—specifically the way author and users interact within a community to 
create new, expanded forms of creative expression of similar core ideas— is a necessary component of 
adding to the cultural meaning of the original work and to the attached expression of creativity.120 The 
importance of having an embodied expression, then, not only relates to having some sort of tangible medium 
through which users are able to comprehend and internalize creative expression; it also has to do with the 
way in which that consumption of a creative expression is internalized within the audience member, and 
how the consumption and interaction with external cultural forces shapes and reshapes future creative 
expression. 
Recognizing the sort of dual-pronged mechanism of acts of creative expression—first, the cultural 
commons that determines the parameters of available ideas, and second, the way in which embodiedness 
helps expression take form—benefits less from a rights- or economics-based paradigm of copyright 
justification and is better suited for a theory like the capabilities theory. Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
are the most widely known scholars who have developed the capabilities theory, and as Nussbaum has 
articulated, “[a]gainst the dominant emphasis on economic growth as an indicator or a nation’s quality of 
life, Sen has insisted on the importance of capabilities, what people are actually able to do and to be.”121 A 
capabilities approach to distributing resources recognizes that because individuals are differently 
positioned, whether it be economically, socioculturally, or physically, distribution schemes should not rely 
purely on egalitarian principles.122 
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While Nussbaum in particular seeks to justify use of the capabilities theory to more effectively 
confront issues of sex inequality and other human rights through exploring the question of fundamental 
entitlements, and Sen focused primarily on economic development,123 by recognizing the cultural currency 
of creativity, I would assert that a similar consideration can and should be imposed onto a copyright 
justification analysis. This would reorient the discussion of property rights away from more traditional 
rights- or economics-based theories,124 and instead anchor the discussion in the sort of capabilities each 
artist has available to exercise an embodied sense of creativity.  
The capabilities theory has been cast as a third approach to ethics in contemporary philosophy, 
juxtaposed against deontology and utilitarianism, which might be best understood as bedrock for both the 
personality theory of copyright and an incentive theory of copyright, accordingly.125 A capabilities approach 
relies on looking outward, to the actual sociocultural landscape, to construct a theory of rights-allocation, 
rather than depending on the more neutral starting point that a Rawlsian social contract theory relies on.126 
In this respect, it recognizes that facially neutral laws that promote equal protection for all implicated parties 
might actually benefit certain groups more than others. In Nussbaum’s theory in particular, “it is the person 
and the realization of that person’s capabilities that is central to ethics, and the existence of rights and their 
specific nature and extent are deduced from the demands of such self-realization.”127 Only by recognizing 
a particular individual’s sociocultural positionality can a set of rights be articulated to effectively maximize 
each person’s capability.  
 Returning to a post-modern understanding creative expression, wherein initial access to a 
cultural commons of possible creative expression leads to a necessary embodied articulation of a novel 
creative expression, we might be able to better understand why, through reliance on a capabilities theory, 
the causal nexus between CAN-created pieces of visual art and the initial coders is too weak to warrant 
copyright coverage.  
 
i. Tier One of Post-Modern Creativity: The Creative Commons128 
 
Beginning with the recognition that all artists in a given sociocultural moment have access to a 
limited vocabulary of ideas from which to draw,129 let’s consider access and input with respect to CAN AI. 
The commons responsible for a set of understandable ideas within a culture go beyond the idea of the public 
domain in copyright.130 Instead, Foucault and Bourdieu recognize that ineffable cultural structure plays a 
part in shaping the expressive vocabulary available to authors in creating a palatable piece of creative 
expression. Not only are there larger cultural structures that play a part in determining the parameters of 
creative expression, but there are also the validating institutions that perpetuate or disrupt the traditional 
modes of creative expression—the “art world,” as it might be called.131 While these institutions can no 
doubt shift over time and recognize new modes of creative expression,132 they nonetheless exert enormous 
control over the shape of creative expression in a given culture at a given time.  
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The significant element in this first tier of creative expression—the cultural commons, both the 
legacy of creative expression that predates a point of new creative expression and the validating institutions 
that shape the available lexicon of creative expression—is largely absent from the CAN “creative” process. 
Even if CAN technology received as input every piece of art available to the public from which to improve 
its creative process, it still would not be fully accessing the creative commons that helps shape an iteration 
of creative expression in a given moment of time.133 CAN technology relies on a particular learning heuristic 
for understanding creativity, and in doing so learns exclusively according to one model of creative 
expression.134 Further, it depends exclusively on deconstructing publicly available works of art to develop 
a sense of creative expression.135 In this sense, it is not engaging in creative practice under the umbrella of 
a cultural commons, which includes systems of expression and validating institutions that ceaselessly 
dialogue with an artist’s choice of expression; instead, CAN mimics creative expression of bygone eras, 
rather than creating new works under the current cultural framework.136  
Refracting the failure of CAN technology to meaningfully interact with contemporary creative 
commons through a capabilities-theory lens, extending copyright coverage for pieces of visual art created 
by CAN AI would in no way contribute to their flourishing as creative participants in the cultural commons. 
The initial code underlying CAN AI more straightforwardly satisfies the first tier of a post-modern 
understanding of creative expression—each individual coder is, by virtue of creating as an individual within 
a larger cultural landscape, markedly influenced by the cultural forces that narrate creative expression. But 
the resultant piece of art, as explored above, does not satisfy the first tier. If a capabilities theory aims to 
maximize the self-actualization of the individual by assigning rights, doing so here by assigning copyright 
coverage to the initial coders would not likely serve that aim. By receiving copyright protection for the 
underlying code that primes CAN AI to learn, the coders are being granted a rights-based recognition for 
their creative efforts; they have responded to the creative commons and designed a software that has the 
ability to “learn.” But the resultant art that CAN technology creates is in very few ways, if any, attached to 
the placement of the individual coders in a larger creative commons.137 Instead, CAN AI learns in a vacuum, 
stripped of the cultural legacy that otherwise attaches itself to creative expression. In seeking to maximize 
self-actualization according to the first tier of a post-modern approach to the creative process, capabilities 
theory weighs against extending copyright coverage to the initial coders for any AI-created piece of art, as 
their positionality in the cultural commons is irrelevant to the creation of the piece of art itself.  
 
ii. Tier Two of Post-Modern Creativity: Embodiedness 
 
A capabilities-theory analysis of the second tier of the post-modern creative process also fails to 
justify extending copyright coverage to the initial coders for CAN-created pieces of art. As explored above, 
an embodied expression of a creative piece of authorship indicates that the piece is both consumable in 
some way by the public and that both the artist and the public are engaged in a kind of cultural dialogue 
through that consumption.138 In other words, the creativity behind the piece perfected as the artist fixes the 
work, and as the public consumes and experiences it. While not all authored work is made publicly 
available, the orientation of the creative work as a piece made by an individual who is part of a large cultural 
collective is nonetheless relevant to the infusion of creativity.139 In this way, a post-modern approach to 
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understanding the importance of embodiedness goes beyond personality theory as a justification for 
copyright coverage.140 It contextualizes the individual artist as a reference point for a larger cultural 
narrative of creative language. The artist who creates an embodied work not only filters culture through 
herself, but also presents a work that contributes to the legacy of her creative culture. 
The requirement of embodiedness starts from the language of the Copyright Act itself, which 
requires that a work of authorship be fixed in a tangible medium.141 Software has a fraught legacy of 
coverage as it is, with some disputing whether the source code is sufficiently fixed in a tangible enough 
medium that there truly is a publicly consumable work of authorship available.142 Putting aside the question 
of whether the software itself is a valid form of creative expression according to a post-modern 
understanding of embodiedness, we are left to explore whether CAN-generated pieces of original art satisfy 
the post-modern paradigm of embodiedness. Interestingly, there is no dispute that a CAN-generated piece 
of art satisfies the literal fixation requirements of the Copyright Act—an art print is viewable by the public 
and readily reproducible. However, given its tenuous beginnings—software being a starting point that has 
attached to it a legacy of uncertain coverage rights—and its cordoned-off form of creativity,143 CAN AI 
fundamentally lacks the embodiedness post-modern theory suggests is necessary for creative expression. 
In creating an embodied work, authors filter culture through their person, relying on whatever myriad pieces 
of creative expression they have been exposed to throughout their lives. Their exposure is undoubtedly 
limited; I, for example, grew up watching a lot of Looney Toons cartoons, but am hardly familiar with 
Marvel comic book characters. Any cartoon I might conceptualize would likely be more influenced by my 
exposure to Looney Tunes than to Marvel characters. Nonetheless, the person-centric filtration is integral 
to the way a final piece of creative work turns out. There is something fundamentally human about the way 
a piece is created, firmly attached to the author’s phenomenological understanding of their creative 
landscape.  
Arguably, the coders are preferencing exposure to certain artwork and modes of creativity over 
others, communicating their personhood in the process—they articulate the creativity heuristic in the code, 
and might even select the input pieces that the CAN technology learns from. Nonetheless, the technology 
breaks down the input pieces and learns “creativity” in a fundamentally non-human way.144 It is exclusively 
relying on pre-existing pieces of art, void of the community under which the pieces are understood.145 In 
this way, despite the work being fixed in a straightforwardly tangible medium, it is decidedly disembodied, 
in that there is no communication between the original coders, their own exposure to creative works, and 
the final audience that may react to the work. The connection to the original human creators, the coders, is 
too attenuated.  
In considering how creative expression requires an embodied process to take place, I want to be 
careful to note that, while the coders behind CAN technology should not be granted copyright coverage for 
any original art the AI creates, a different sort of machine-created piece of creative expression is not 
necessarily foreclosed from satisfying a post-modern theory of creativity. Let’s return to the Naruto—or 
monkey selfie—case as an example. In that case, the photographer who labored to set up the camera was 
ultimately extended coverage for the photograph.146 There, the issue was whether the monkey should own 
the copyright instead,147 but it offers an example that illustrates when an author sets up a machine without 
knowledge of what will be produced. When a photographer sets up a camera on a timer, without knowledge 
of what will be captured, they are still considered the author under copyright law. This satisfies the 
formalists’ argument that authorship merely requires an author to “devise a creative plan for the work.”148 
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David Slater devised a creative plan wherein he understood that the monkeys might take photographs. 
Similarly, the coders responsible for CAN AI arguably devised a creative plan wherein they understood 
that the technology would learn creative aesthetic patterns to create novel pieces of art.  
Examining the element of embodiedness by looking at post-modern art might more clearly illustrate 
why the Naruto photo should receive coverage under a post-modern theory of creativity but the CAN-
created art should not. In 1917, Marcel Duchamp found a urinal in an alleyway, took it, and submitted it—
without any adjustments to the physical structure—to the New York Society of Independent Artist’ 
exhibition.149 From this piece, Duchamp catalyzed an entirely new approach to understanding what was and 
was not art; his piece was commentary on art, and as such was widely acclaimed as a provocative display 
of human creativity.150 Duchamp’s ready-mades do not actually do anything different visually or 
structurally to the objects on display.151 Nonetheless, Andy Warhol owned Duchamp’s Fountain piece until 
1988, when it was sold for over $68,000,152 highlighting the significant role it played and continues to play 
in the creative arts world. Duchamp is one example of an artist whose works are seemingly uncreative, in 
that they are indirectly “created” by the artist, who is using found objects to make commentary rather than 
use traditional forms of creative expression to make a new piece of art. Consider, too, John Cage’s “4’33” 
composition, which consists of four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence “performed” in front of an 
audience.153 The piece, which offers audiences no lasting memories of notes or references to the musical 
legacy Cage grew up steeped in, instead offers a meta-creative message: that silence is a fallacy, and that 
each moment of the lived experience is demarcated by a series of circumstantially particular sounds (think 
rain pattering on a roof top, a muffled cough from an audience member, the squeak of a chair).154 
Artists like Duchamp and Glass are engaging in meta-creative choices about what to present to the 
world as art.155 While the works they introduced into the creative lexicon were not traditionally “creative,” 
they represented an active examination of the creative process and of what was valued creatively. Their 
works irrevocably influenced the creative landscape under which they were created. Arguably, this is 
exactly what CAN-created art does, too; it learns a particular creativity heuristic and creates art under the 
umbrella of that heuristic, attempting to illustrate how creativity works and looks. However, the difference 
between artists like Duchamp and Glass, and CAN-AI on the other hand—all of which are engaging in acts 
of meta-creativity—is that artists like Duchamp and Glass are expressing in their works a fundamental 
embodiedness that is entirely lacking in CAN-AI-created pieces of art. Duchamp, Glass, and others of their 
ilk are providing an embodied form of creative criticism through their work. Necessarily attached to their 
pieces is a cultural commentary or criticism. CAN-created works, on the other hand, are not criticisms of 
the works that came before. A human might be capable of constructing a critique through her viewing of 
CAN-created art, but that is not what the coders or the CAN technology are attempting to provoke in 
viewers by creating new pieces of art. Meta-creative human artists are not just giving you the idea of meta-
creativity; they are actually giving you an example of it. CAN-technology, on the other hand, is intentionally 
stripped of the human critique that necessarily accompanies human-created meta-creative works.  
The capabilities theory provides a way to separate a timed, random photograph, or a piece of found 
art, and CAN-created art according to post-modern embodiedness principles. A capabilities approach 
recognizes how different matrices can play into supporting the greatest self-actualization of an individual’s 
rights. In analyzing the extent to which rights should be granted along the line of embodied forms of 
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creativity, one might consider matrices like volition, temporality, predictability and control, community 
interaction and dialogue, and human filtration. Embodiedness requires that creativity be filtered through 
and among human authors and consumers, as the human work is a commentary on the creative process 
itself, not a distilled regurgitation of it. It takes into account the author’s time, place and exposure to creative 
works; it also takes into account the audiences’ responses, consumption, and sense of community. What is 
lacking in both a randomly placed and timed camera and CAN-created pieces of art are a sense of volition 
and predictability. Embodiedness does not necessarily require that the work produced by an author be 
volitional, predictable, or even produced by the human herself, but it does require that there not be so 
attenuated a relationship between the human author and the resultant work that the spirit of embodiedness—
the physicality of author exposed to creative data points and the way in which the art it understood and 
reacted to—must remain recognizably intact.  
Failing to meet some of the really fundamental ways post-modern thinkers understand creative 
expression, the capabilities theory highlights why CAN-created pieces should not receive copyright 
coverage. The capabilities theory seeks to provide rights to individuals with an aim toward increased human 
dignity, recognizing that normative obligations and cultural power distribution should be taken into account 




Why Traditional Justifications for Copyright Do Not Extend to CAN Technology Coders 
 
 While the concept of author is a culturally, politically, economically, and socially constructed 
category and not a real or natural one,157 expanding the parameters of our statutory and common law 
understanding of author to the coders responsible for CAN-technology-created pieces of art would create 
an untenable framework for understanding authorship moving forward. The formalist attitude relies on an 
understanding of copyright that ignores the underlying theory of causation implicitly relied upon in 
contemporary copyright jurisprudence.158 A necessity for granting copyright protection is having enough 
causal connective tissues between traditional and newer justifications for copyright such that proximate 
cause between author and work is clearly established.159 In the case of CAN-created works of art, relying 
on bedrock principles of copyright coverage, including a personality rights-based theory, an incentive-
access economic theory, and post-modern frameworks of creativity and rights allocation makes clear that 
CAN-created works lack the requisite causal connections to the original coders such that the coders should 
be granted copyright coverage. The lack of causal connection is only exacerbated when viewed in light of 
the complicated and unsatisfactory history software coverage has under copyright jurisprudence. While 
CAN-AI is undoubtedly an impressive and important technological development, copyright protection is 
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